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An Economic Interpretation of the Pashtunwali
Tom Ginsbur

Law as we know and conceive of it is a product of the modern
state. Most of us, especially in law schools, think of rules as being primarily enacted by the legislature or administrative agencies; we think of courts as the primary adjudicative institutions;
and we think of enforcement as being a product of state bureaucrats, including police and prosecutors. As has been long recognized, however, this concept of legal centrism is radically incomplete, even within the zone of the nation-state.' It is an especially
poor fit when one examines groups at the periphery of nationstates who operate quasi-legal systems of varying degrees of efficacy and persistence. These systems provide a good deal of "order
without (state) law."2
This Article analyzes the Pashtunwali, the tribal code of the
Pashtuns, from a political-economy perspective. The Pashtuns
are the ethnic group of some forty million that occupies a large
swath of territory across Afghanistan and Pakistan that has
never been completely integrated into a state.3 The decade-long
conflict in Afghanistan has brought renewed attention to the
Pashtuns, whose members are prominent in both the pseudogovernment and the Taliban. The tribal code is a central element of

t Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Daniel Rosengard for research assistance and to
Daniel Abebe, Peter Leeson, Richard McAdams, and Lesley Wexler for helpful comments.
I am especially indebted to Aziz Huq for extensive comments.
1 See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, UnderstandingLegal Pluralism:Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 Sydney L Rev 375 (2008); David D. Friedman, Law's Order:
What Economics Has to Do with Law and Why It Matters (Princeton 2000). See also
Robert D. Cooter, Book Review: Against Legal Centrism, 81 Cal L Rev 417, 421 (1993),
reviewing Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard 1991).
2 See generally Ellickson, Orderwithout Law(cited in note 1).
3 Akbar S. Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and Society: Traditional Structure and Economic Development in a 7ibal Society 92, 99 (Routledge 1980) ("[The region's] external
political history has been a constant struggle to maintain its boundaries against larger
state systems attempting to capture, cage, subjugate or encapsulate it.").
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Pashtun identity: indeed, it is said that to be a Pashtun is to observe the Pashtunwali.4
Though the Pashtun customs bear some similarity to customary laws of other Afghan tribes, they are distinctive both for
their persistence and harshness. They form the primary normative rules in force in the region: governments in both Pakistan
and Afghanistan have tenuous reach into the areas where many
Pashtuns live and in some cases have no contact at all with these
populations. Afghanistan has never really had a central government with effective reach throughout the country, and Pakistani
criminal and civil law does not apply, even nominally, in the socalled Tribal Areas of the Northwest Frontier Province. 5
Many of the harsh rules of the previous Taliban government
have their origin in Pashtun custom, rather than classical Islamic sources; in particular, the treatment of women has garnered a
good deal of negative attention in recent years.6 The Pashtunwali, it is implied, is a barbaric code, whose replacement with modern law would be an advance for all concerned. This way of framing the problem contrasts a primitive rural population with the
enlightened moderns who live under the rule of law. Bringing
law to the barbarian is a modern mission civilisatrice,helping to
justify a continued Western presence in Afghanistan.
I argue, instead, that the Pashtunwali has a particular logic
of its own and is an example of what Richard McAdams and I
called in another context "adjudicating in anarchy."7 In a society
in which there is no effective state government, citizens will have
to develop alternative ways of resolving disputes. Sanctions in
such a society are private and are carried out by the victim himself (usually not herself) rather than any centralized govern' See Pashtoonwah, (Khyber.org) online at http://www.khyber.org/culture/Pashtun
wali.shtml (visited Sept 9, 2011) ("Pukhtoonwali, Pukhto and Pukhtoon have become
almost synonymous terms.... This un-written code is the keystone of the arch of the
Pukhtoons' social fabric. It exercises a great influence on their actions and has been held
sacrosanct by them generation after generation."); Asta Olesen, Islam and Politics in
Afghanistan 33 (Curzon 1995). Note that many urban and educated Pashtuns disdain
this image. See Declan Walsh, Arithmeticon the Frontier,112 Granta 161, 171 (2010).
5 Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and Society at 9 (cited in note 3); see Pak Const Art 247
H§ 3, 7 (establishing that neither Parliament nor the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
regulate Tribal Areas).
6 See, for example, Peter Marsden, The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Orderin
Afghanistan 88-101 (Zed Books Ltd 1998); Nancy Hatch Dupree, Afghan Women under
the Taliban, in William Maley, ed, Fundamentalism Reborn?Afghanistan and the Taliban 145, 146-159 (Hurst and Company 2001).
7 See generally Tom Ginsburg and Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy:
An Expressive Theory of InternationalDispute Resolution, 45 Wm & Mary L Rev 1229
(2004).
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ment. But private violence carries the risk of retaliation and the
escalation of violence to higher levels. The need to limit the escalation of violence requires institutions both to define violations
and to adjudicate disputes so that parties do not spend too many
resources on conflict. The Pashtunwali provides a rough guideline for determining legitimate subjects of conflict and also a system, the jirga,for resolving disputes once they arise. It thus presents a protolegal system, cohabiting with, supplementing, and
sometimes clashing with the formal system of state law.8
The Pashtunwali does not provide detailed rules for every
contingency. As we shall see, the normative content of the Pashtunwali is very fluid, and it is best thought of as a code of honor
rather than a legal code in the conventional sense. Legal codes,
after all, are products of the modernizing state and its impulse
toward organization.9 Instead, the Pashtunwali consists of a set
of metarules about the legitimate subjects of conflict and legitimate ways of resolving them. It is a cultural system that channels, and thus limits, private violence.
My analysis is consistent with other recent work on private
ordering and stateless peoples, as well as the broader literature
on social norms.10 The new institutionalism in the social sciences
has focused attention on the economic functions of legal and quasi-legal norms, showing how both can resolve various institutional problems." The gist of this literature is that people have great
capacity for self-organization. In contrast with the Hobbesian
vision of the state as a necessary imposition to prevent people
from engaging in endless conflict, we observe the possibility of
emergent social order that can produce effective systems of law
and norms. Surely the Pashtunwali is one of the more vital examples of such a normative system, simply by virtue of its geographic spread and temporal resilience, even during periods of
extended conflict. It thus provides an opportunity to extend our
understanding of private ordering. I point out at the end of this
Article that this functional success comes at a great cost, namely
' See generally Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism,22 L & Socy Rev 869 (1988).
9 John Henry Merryman and Rogelio Perez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tadition: An
Introduction to the Legal Systems ofEurope and Latin America 27-33 (Stanford 3d ed
2007).
10 See generally Ellickson, Order without Law (cited in note 1); Peter T. Leeson, The
Laws ofLawlessness, 38 J Legal Stud 471 (2009); Peter T. Leeson, Gypsies (unpublished
manuscript, 2010), online at http://peterleeson.com/Gypsies.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2011).
11 See generally Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge 1990); Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and EconomicPerformance(Cambridge 1990).
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the suppression of half the population. In addition to the gender
inequities associated with Pashtun society, the violence of the
region poses further normative problems.
The Article is organized as follows: Part I considers the problem of law in an anarchic environment, summarizing recent literature. Part II introduces the institutions of Pashtun society
and the norms of the Pashtunwali, analyzing the logic of retaliation and the institutional solutions provided by the jirga.Part III
considers the two normative problems identified above: gender
inequities and relatively high levels of violence in the region. It
considers a simple strategy for introducing greater normative
coherence to the Pashtunwali that might also ameliorate its
morally troubling aspects-the expansion of literacy. While not a
panacea, greater levels of education could potentially facilitate
clearer substantive norms as well as an improved quality of life
for women. Part IV concludes.
I. THE PROBLEMS OF STATELESS SOCIETIES
James C. Scott, in his recent magisterial treatment of upland Southeast Asia, notes that many of the histories of the region are fragmentary and are written from the perspective of the
governors rather than the governed. 12 These accounts depict
state-building as a benign and even benevolent process of bringing peoples into the fold of the court center, where they can enjoy
the benefits of civilization. In actual fact, however, state-building
involves massive amounts of conscripted labor, capture of populations, and the imposition of hierarchical social structures. Concentrated populations in urban centers are also more subject to
disease, especially before the emergence of modern scientific
medicine. It is thus not surprising that, in many times and places, people fled from state-building projects to more peripheral
geographic locales, where they were able to take shelter. For
much of history, "it is abundantly clear that it was at least as
common for people to flee the state as to approach it."13 For peoples fleeing states, private ordering was the best option.
The origins of the Pashtuns are shrouded in mystery, but
from what we can tell, their history is not completely consistent
with Scott's account of Southeast Asia.' 4 It is true that Pashtuns
12 James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland
SoutheastAsia 160-61 (Yale 2009).
13 Id at 162.

14 Walsh, 112 Granta at 170 (cited in note 4).
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frequently live outside the effective authority of a state, but their
history is a bit more complicated in that Afghan state-building,
such as it is, has also been a Pashtun project. Afghanistan as an
idea dates back to the eighteenth century Pashtun leader Ahmed
Shah Durrani, who unified various tribes to form a new state.
But that state did not have extensive reach. It was only at the
turn of the twentieth century that Durrani's successor, Abdul
Rahman Khan, began to fashion a civilian bureaucracy.1 5 Scott
characterizes the Pashtuns as having an "antistate nationalism"
that has led not only to demands for a separate autonomous
state, but rather to the maintenance of a stateless society.16
Whether these demands for maintaining statelessness are the
cause or consequence of Afghanistan's weak state is unclear, but
the fact is that the Afghan government has not touched the lives
of many of its citizens in any positive way.
The Pakistani side of the border has a different history, but
the same basic result. The Pakistani portion of the Pashtunistan
region was part of British India, though it was administered
quite indirectly as a remote corner of the Raj. To this day, the
primary governing instrument for Pakistani Pashtunistan is a
British-era colonial act called the Frontier Crimes Regulation.
Constitutional rights do not apply in the region, and each tribal
agency is governed by a "political agent" appointed by the center,
who wields all executive and judicial power.1 7 Pakistan has essentially ignored the Pashtuns and other "tribals" through a policy of benign neglect.18
Whatever the causes, many Pashtuns receive few services
from the states in which they nominally live. Stateless societies,
though, need rules just as much as those with established governments. The difference is that, without a state, centralized
sanctions cannot be assumed. Instead, law in stateless societies
must be enforced by communities and individuals themselves.
One way to think about this is that norms must be self-enforcing,
15 Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and
Modernization, 1880-1946134-51 (Stanford 1969).
16 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed at 244-45 (cited in note 12). See E.J.
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme,Myth, Reality 64 (Cambridge 2d ed 1992).
17 Aziz Z. Huq, Mechanisms ofPoliticalCapturein Pakistan'sSuperiorCourts, 10 YB
Islamic & Middle E L 21, 28-30 (2003-2004).
18 See International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA, Asia
Report No 178 1-2 (Oct 21, 2009), online at http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/
Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/178_pakistan
countering-militancy_in fata.ashx (visited Sept 9, 2011).
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meaning that it is within each individual's interest to comply
with them even without centralized coercion.19
In a very different context-namely, international lawProfessor McAdams and I explored how adjudicative institutions
can be effective even without effective sanctions. 20 The central
argument is that legal institutions can work by coordinating private expectations of other parties' likely behavior. The theory
relies on a class of games in which players wish to coordinate
their behavior, but disagree over how to coordinate. 21 Consider,
for example, a pair of disputants engaged in a fight over land.
Each wants to maintain possession of a piece of property, and so
signals to the other that he will fight hard to keep it. But fighting
is costly and socially destructive. Other things being equal, each
disputant would prefer not to fight. However, revealing this preference would induce the other party to be more aggressive about
pursuing the property. This situation is captured in the "HawkDove" game, and it represents a common social situation. 22
In the Hawk-Dove game, Hawk represents the aggressive
strategy, while Dove represents the passive strategy. Each player would prefer to play Hawk to the other's Dove. If both players
play the aggressive Hawk strategy, however, a fight ensues. On
the other hand, if both play the passive Dove strategy, neither
gets the property, which is suboptimal from a social perspective.
Each player's preference ordering is such that he wishes to coordinate with the other party, so as to avoid a costly fight, but the
parties disagree over how to coordinate their behavior.
How might law without central enforcement resolve this
problem? Suppose that the two disputants cannot resolve the
problem. Each mobilizes his supporters-relatives, friends, and
community members-and asserts that he will fight to win the
dispute. The situation now threatens to escalate, potentially
harming many members of the community. Suppose next that
someone-a local notable, a neighbor, or even a judge-steps
forward to help resolve the dispute. This person has no coercive
power over the disputants, but after hearing evidence, pronounces that one side or the other is in the right. One side of the dis19 See generally Kai A. Konrad and Wolfgang Leininger, Self-Enforcing Norms and
the Efficient Non-CooperativeOrganization of Clans (Ruhr Economic Papers No 16, June
2007), online at http://www.rwi-essen.de/media/content/pages/publikationen/ruhr-econ
omic-papers/REP_07_O16.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2011).
20 See generally Ginsburg and McAdams, 45 Wm & Mary L Rev (cited in note 7).
21 Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U Ill L Rev
1043, 1052-74 (2005).
22 Id at 1054-57.
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pute is surely happy. But consider the situation from the perspective of the loser. 23 The loser is unhappy about the result and
must decide whether or not to comply. No doubt the loser's first
choice would be not to comply; but knowing that the other party
has "won," the loser may suspect that the winner will be more
recalcitrant and less likely to back down. Further, the winner's
supporters may be willing to help him, whereas the loser's supporters, expecting the winning side to defend its claim, may now
back down. In such a situation, the adjudicator's decision may in
fact be self-fulfilling, in that parties' expectations about others'
behavior may lead to compliance without centralized sanctions.
Such situations are common in stateless societies. In medieval Iceland, for example, there were no centralized enforcement
bodies, but a set of courts issued rulings that typically were complied with by private actors. 24 One of the mechanisms for ensuring compliance was that the legal announcement created common knowledge, so that the disputants and others in the society
updated their assessments about the likely behavior of the other
party. Even without directly imposed sanctions, law can make a
difference if it shapes private beliefs about the likely strategies of
other players. The job of legal institutions in such settings is to
coordinateprivate behavior rather than coerce it.
As in medieval Iceland, the Pashtunwali is an example of a
system of non-state norms and institutions in which self-help
and noncoercive adjudication are the chief mechanisms of resolving problems. The key is to have norms and institutions that can
coordinate private behavior and reduce violence. The next Section of the Article describes the institutions in more detail.
II. THE PASHTUNWALI AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF PASHTUN
SOCIETY
A.

Honor and Equality

The Pashtunwali (sometimes spelled Pashtunwalli or Pushtunwali) is usually translated as the tribal code or tribal law of
the Pashtuns. Though referred to as a code, it is more a code of
behavior or honor than a legal code. The rules are not written
down, and many of them involve the central concept of nang,
23 Martin Shapiro, Courts:A Comparativeand PoliticalAnalysis 2 (Chicago 1980).

24 Friedman, Law's Orderat 263-64 (cited in note 1); William Ian Miller, Bloodtaking
and Peacemaking:Feud,Law, and Society in Saga Iceland 228 (Chicago 1990); Ginsburg

and McAdams, 45 Wm & Mary L Rev at 14-15 (cited in note 7).
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usually translated as honor.25 Certain actions are seen as helping
to build honor, while others are seen as hurting it. One can think
of nang as loosely analogous to a positive reputation, a capital
good that is accumulated over time and can be lost.
Pashtun society is noted for its lack of hierarchy: each Pashtun male possesses unassailable rights, though there is deference
given to elders and those who attain leadership positions.26 A
gun is an essential possession and serves as an equalizing
force. 27 The Pashtunwali has also become an object of fascination
and revulsion from outside for its treatment of women. Women
are inferior and subordinate but are also a locus of honor, to be
protected above all.2 8 Dishonoring a man's wife is certain cause
for conflict.
The society is segmentary, meaning that it comprises numerous small self-regulating groups that periodically come together to form a larger group. 29 Such societies are riven by conflict. As one scholar puts it, "Rivalry and status competition [are]
key defining element[s] within as well as between ...

the seg-

ments."30 Tarboorwali,or cousin rivalry, and siyali,or status envy, are key factors, so that even within small family groups there
are sources of tension and centrifugal pressure. 31 But when faced
with external pressures, segmentary societies are capable of coordinating action against outsiders. Hence, we see the long Pashtun history of successful repulsion of foreign invaders, who in
modem times include the British, the Russians, and the Americans. 32
Preserving honor is essential in a stateless society, particularly one that is segmentary. The risk of stateless societies is
that stronger actors will prey on weaker ones. Stronger actors
25 See Pushtunwali:Honouramong Them, The Economist 36, 37 (Dec 23, 2006).
26 Willi Steul, Paschtunwali ein Elirenkodex und Seine Rechtliche Relevanz 309
(Steiner 1981).
27 See Walsh, 112 Granta at 164-65 (cited in note 4).
28 Steul, Paschtunwaliat310 (cited in note 26).
29 Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and Society at 116-25 (cited in note 3).
so Craig Cordell Naumann, The Pashtunwali'sRelevance as a Tool for Solving the
"AfghanCrisis" 131 (research report submitted to the American Institute of Afghanistan
Studies, 2009) (on file with University of Chicago Legal Forum).
31 See id (siyali); Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and Society at 3, 94 (cited in note 3)
("Cousin rivalry levels as it consumes the Pukhtun. The Father's Brother's Son is the
bane of his existence and main rival for power and status.").
32 Addiction, Crime, Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium 123
(2009), online at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afgha
nOpiumiTrade 2009_web.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2011) (UN Office on Drugs and Crime
report documenting Pashtun pride in repelling invaders); Julie Williams, Islam: Understandingthe Hstory,Beliefs and Culture48 (Enslow 2008) (overview of Pashtun history).
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will be aggressive, assuming that weaker actors will play a passive strategy in the Hawk-Dove game described above. 33 Honor
norms may emerge in situations in which each member of the
society has private information about his ability to defend himself and to assert claims. To avoid becoming a target of predatory
attack, each actor has an incentive to signal that he is willing to
assert and defend himself, which in turn can crystallize into
norms about honor. 34 Honor norms deter aggressors from engaging in predatory behavior, since they force all individuals to signal that they will play the Hawkish strategy. Still, there will inevitably be conflict. If even the weak have an incentive to signal
that they will fight, strong players will not be sure whom to prey
on and may make a mistake. This leads to conflict, and a need for
institutions to resolve it.
B.

Institutions

A central institution in village life is the jirga (or shura), an
institution common to central Asian tribes that consists of a public meeting of the notables of the community. The term is familiar to some in the West for the Joya jirga,or grand jirga,called on
periodically to decide national affairs of the various Afghan
tribes, but jirgasare more common at local levels where they decide disputes. Jirgasare formed by local notables, who are neither elected nor appointed but are seen as having the wisdom
and knowledge necessary to resolve disputes.
From our perspective, the jirga is a key institution for coordination in an internally riven society. In a jirgaprocedure, each
member of the jirga has equal status and deliberation is open.
(Though jirgas are open to the public, women and children are
not typically allowed to attend). A jirga involves people connected
with one or the other side in equal proportions. All sit in a circle
as formal equals, and each is permitted to speak. There is no
fixed time period for deliberation: some cases take weeks. Sanctions can include ostracism, fines, and the specification of compensation. 35

3 See McAdams, 2005 U Ill L Rev at 1054-57 (cited in note 21).
34 Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen, Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence
in the South 4-6, 89 (Westview 1996).
3 Disobedience to the jirga's sanctions may result in severe punishment, such as
burning a house. See Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and Society at 91 (cited in note 3).
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Before a jirgasession, a bond is sometimes collected from the
parties and given to a third person for safekeeping. 36 This bond
can take the form of cash, property, guns, or even a person who is
pledged to guarantee enforceability. A party that does not accept
the decision will have to forfeit the bond. Jirga decisions are not
written down, which is hardly surprising given low rates of literacy. Nevertheless, good decisions are seen as having precedential
value. 37 There is no formal structure of appeal, but parties can
ask for a second jirgato be formed to review the case if they are
unhappy with the first decision. There is no way to know how
frequently this form of appeal is utilized, but many descriptions
of the jirga leave this feature out, so it is probable that most
jirgasare able to resolve disputes on the first try, or alternatively
that disputants do not try again when the first jirgafails.
The institutional structure of the jirga means that its decisions are "common knowledge" among the disputants and other
members of the community. 38 Common knowledge refers to the
idea that we are all aware of the content of the decision but also
that we know that we share this knowledge. Not only do I know
that the decision has been issued, but I know that you know, and
that everyone else knows. 39 As Benson puts it:
In order for a dispute to end satisfactorily, a decision has
to be acceptable-verifiable-not just to the parties most
directly affected, but to the groups or firms representing
these parties and to groups who, although not directly involved, might be drawn into a confrontation with one of
the groups in the dispute under consideration. 40
A public pronouncement that A or B is correct will inform
not only the parties about each others' likely behavior, but will
also inform others who might join one side or the other as allies.
For example, if B loses a case, B's relatives now have an excuse
to beg off from the battle, since they can argue that A's relatives
will fight harder for the right in question. This in turn affects the
36 International Legal Foundation, The Customary Laws of Afghanistan 8 (Sept
2004), online at http://theilf.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/reports-ilfa-customarylaws.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2011).
37 Id at 9.
38 Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common
Knowledge 3-4 (Princeton 2001).
39 Id.
40 Bruce L. Benson, CustomaryLaw with 1rivate Means of Resolving Disputes and
DispensingJustice: A Description of a Modern System of Law and Order without State
Coercion,9 J Libertarian Stud 25, 36 (1990).
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disputants' assessments about whether it is worth continuing to
fight. Common knowledge facilitates dispute resolution.
Besides the jirga,there are other institutions in Afghan village life that contribute to dispute resolution: a malik, who holds
a kind of executive authority and may be a local notable or literate person whose function is to interact with the state on behalf of the community; and a mullah, who is the repository of
religious law. Islamic law, or sharia, differs from the Pashtun
norms in a number of areas, including the rights of women. 41 The
relationships among these authorities and their relationships
with the jirga are quasi-constitutional in that they involve a separation of powers of sorts, in which each body derives authority
from a different source of legitimacy. 42 Mullahs represent Islam,
firgas reflect the will of the community, and maliks derive their
authority from a mix of sources, including level of education, position in the social structure, or wealth.
One can think of this structure as involving three competing
authorities, preventing the dominance of any one of them. If a
dispute arises, one can go to the malik or mullah, or to the jirga
itself. Even within a jirga, parties can choose the governing law,
either sharia or pashtunwali (meaning the local customary variant in this context). The competition among authorities means
that any one institution has a greater incentive to provide a substantively just decision, or at least one capable of being enforced. 43 Otherwise, the institution will not be utilized in the future and its members will lose status. Without the centralized
enforcement machinery of a modern state, compliance will depend on the attitudes of the members of the society, and this
forms a constraint on decision makers.
Of the various institutions, the jirgaseems to have the highest normative authority, as befits a society of radical democracy,
though this will depend on particular times and places, and in
particular the relationship with the outside world. Indeed, while
the structure of the jirga has been remarkably enduring, it has
come under some pressure in recent years. The Taliban sought to
promote sharia over the Pashtunwali and placed the mullah at
41 Proof of adultery under sharia requires the testimony of four male witnesses but in
Pashtunwali can be based on hearsay. Women have no right to inherit under Pashtunwali and can almost never divorce. Major Richard Tod Strickland, The Way of the Pashtun:
Pashtunwali,10.3 Canadian Army J 44, 52 (2007).
42 Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, The Microfoundations of State Building: Informal
Institutions and Local Public Goods in Rural Afghanistan *11-12 (unpublished PhD
dissertation, The University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2009) (on file with U Chi Legal F).
43 Ginsburg and McAdams, 45 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1274 (cited in note 7).
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the center of the village, undermining traditional structures. 44
War has also disrupted structures, as the warlords displace the
traditional jirgas.The actual situation of village governance at
any particular time and place, then, is quite fluid.
In institutional terms, the jirga has an advantage over others in that its decisions are issued in public among the representatives of the entire community. It is therefore not surprising
that outsiders-the state, the Taliban-have sought to undermine the jirga and to promote the authority of the malik and
mullah. In essence, outsiders seek to end the stateless, selfregulating character of the community and to provide channels
for outside interests to determine important policies. Yet the institutions of local society have remained remarkably persistent
and hence resistant to state-building efforts.
C.

Norms of the Pashtunwali

Because the Pashtuns are largely illiterate, their tribal law
is not written down in a legal code. The actual substantive norms
that are applied may differ from place to place and are of fairly
simple elaboration: wrongs involve death, physical injury, offenses against the sexual purity of women, and injuries to honor or
rights. 45 Yet Pashtuns talk about the Pashtunwali as if it were a
unified code. How can this be? The analogy here may be to privately developed language. 46 Although language in most places is
not centrally regulated, the spontaneous development of language allows it to spread over a large geographic scope. There
are, to be sure, local variations in the way English is spoken in
various jurisdictions around the world, but the basic rules are
such as to allow someone from Cornwall to communicate with
people from California and Calcutta. Similarly, different villages
and regions have different versions of the tribal code, yet it bears
enough unity to be considered a single object.
The Pashtunwali is noteworthy for its simplicity. It contains
very few rules of substantive law, mostly revolving around the
protection of one's own honor and the honor of women (the latter
referred to as tor).47 Gender segregation rules, or purdah, are
rigidly enforced.4 8 The central concepts are behavioral and in44 Murtazashvili, The MicrofoundationsofState Buildingat *82 (cited in note 42).
45 Steul, Paschtunwaliat311 (cited in note 26).
46 See Benson, 9 J Libertarian Stud at 28 (cited in note 40).
47 Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and Society at 3, 202 (cited in note 3).
48 See Palwasha Kakar, 7Tibal Law ofPashtunwaliand Women's Legislative Author-
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volve the specification of compensation to be offered for a set of
loosely defined wrongs. A primary norm is to uphold individual,
group, and tribal honor. Thus, when one's honor is harmed, one
has a normative duty to respond using one of the modalities of
the Pashtunwali. This Section describes the norms in greater
detail.
1. Hospitality, revenge, and submission.
The Pashtunwali is conventionally described as comprising
three key concepts: melmastia, hospitality; badal, revenge; and
nanawati, submission or asylum.4 9 Specific bad actions are accompanied by nerkhs, the recognized sanction to be imposed.
These can consist of a fine or debt (por) to be paid as compensation for liability (tawan) or of other penalties. The content of the
por can involve compensation in cash or women, and there is a
preference for women as they are seen as binding the families
together, thus reducing the risk of future flare-ups. 50 In case of
an ordinary murder among the Ahmedzai, for example, two
young women are required to be transferred to the other party.5 1
This practice, known as swara, is an object of fascination and
repulsion for the outside world. 52
Let us examine each of the central concepts.53 Melmastia, or
hospitality, involves the requirement of giving shelter and protection (panah) to those who ask for it, even if the person is a
criminal. There are anecdotal stories of families giving protection
to people who have just killed a family member, thus maintaining the panah. Once the perpetrator leaves the home, however,
he may be killed. On the other hand, someone who injures a
guest will have to pay por to the shelterer, whose honor has been
implicitly violated.
Badal, or revenge, allows one to seek retribution against
someone who has caused one harm. There is some evidence that
ity *4-6 (unpublished research paper, Harvard University, 2003), online at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/research/kakar.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2011).
49 James W. Spain, Pathansof the Latter Day 42 (Oxford 1995). See also James W.
Spain, The Way of the Pathans46-47 (Oxford 2d ed 1972).
50 Pushtunwali:Honour among Them, The Economist at 38 (cited in note 25); Walsh,
112 Granta at 177 (cited in note 4).
51 International Legal Foundation, The Customary Laws ofAfghanistan at 11 (cited
in note 36).
52 Ashfaq Yusufzai, Blood Feuds Trap Girls in 'CompensationMarriages,Inter Press
Service News Agency (Apr 1, 2006), online at http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?
idnews=32737 (visited Sept 9, 2011).
53 See Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and Society at 90-91 (cited in note 3).
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revenge should be greater than the initial slight, as captured in
the proverb "He is not a Pukhtun [sic] who does not give a blow
for a pinch."54 While decentralized sanctions carried out by the
victim are common in societies without state law, the Pashtunwali is unusual in imposing an affirmative duty to seek revenge:
failing to do so will cause one to suffer a reputational sanction in
being thought of as a coward. For example, in the case of the
murder of one's relative, the reputational sanction creates a partial or contingent duty to kill a member of the aggressor's group.
This duty is not perfect. An alternative to being killed is for
the murderer to offer the victim's family nanawat, a formal
apology that consists of symbolic submission of the wrongdoer to
the victim's family. A sincere offer of nanawatiis to be accepted.
Nanawati can also involve the relatives of the wrongdoer. For
example, in the case of a murder, the murderer's relatives may
help carry the victim's body to the grave or accompany the
wrongdoer to the victim's house to slaughter one or more sheep.
We can now summarize the Pashtunwali in a few simple
principles:
1) Honor is paramount, and the honor of women is to be protected.
2) Gender boundaries must be rigidly maintained.
3) One has a right to compensation, or por, when one is
wronged.
4) Revenge is tolerated and even encouraged.
5) Apologies accompanied by por are to be accepted.
6) Guests are to be sheltered.
7) The jirga is to be obeyed.
These rules are not, obviously, a detailed code of substantive
rules of conduct like a true legal code. But they do provide a
framework for behavior and for managing conflicts among people. The next Section provides two illustrative cases of how disputes over murder were resolved in accordance with this framework.
2. Examples.
Let us provide some examples from Pakistan of how the system works in practice. Two Waziris, Haji Sardar and Shah

54 Id at 90, quoting Akbar S. Ahmed, Mataloona:Pakhto Proverbs57 (Oxford 1975).
See also Walsh, 112 Granta at 186 (cited in note 4) ("You kill two of my people; I will kill
ten of yours.").
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Tofan, had a dispute over water allocation.5 5 The dispute escalated and Haji Sardar's son shot and killed Shah Tofan's son. Haji
Sardar's family was then forced to leave. Village elders then
stepped in and decided that the underlying dispute and the resultant murder should be resolved by the murderer's family giving two girls and 300,000 Pakistani rupees to the family of Shah
Tofan. Shah Tofan's family, in turn, was required to provide a
girl for marriage into Haji Sardar's family, in order to signify its
acceptance of the jirga's decision. Shah Tofan ultimately rejected
the cash payment, but agreed to the exchange of girls. The firga's
decision effectively resolved the dispute.
In another case, a farmer borrowed money from a local businessman and pledged his forthcoming poppy crop as collateral.5 6
But a severe drought destroyed the poppy crop, so the farmer
could not repay his loan. In response to a demand for repayment,
as well as in an attempt to gain sympathy,
the farmer explained that he only had his wife and children to offer in exchange for his debt.... To the farmer's
surprise, the businessman demanded that the farmer
turn his family over to repay the loan. The farmer told his
wife and children to go with the businessman, but as they
were leaving the house, the farmer retrieved his rifle and
shot and killed the businessman.5 7
When the jirga heard the case, it decided that the farmer
was not required to pay compensation to the victim's family.58 In
this second case, one sees that the businessman violated implicit
norms, probably because asking for the man's wife violated
norms of protecting women's honor.
D.

The Logic of Mandatory Retaliation

As the examples make clear, the Pashtunwali relies for its
efficacy on the threat of collective retaliation for wrongs suffered
by a family member. Blood feud, in which families or clans take
revenge on each other, is a characteristic of some premodern societies and persists in other places around the world.5 9 In such
55 The following draws on International Legal Foundation, The Customary Laws of
Afghanistan at 12-13 (cited in note 36).
56 Id at 19.

57 Id.
58 Id.
59 William Ian Miller, Eye for an Eye 119-21 (Cambridge 2006).
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societies, revenge is not merely an option but a duty.6 0 The duty
to blood feud can be thought of as providing a credible deterrent
to murder. Knowing that a potential victim will be dishonored if
he does not seek revenge, a potential aggressor will assume a
high probability of response and hence will be more reluctant to
engage in aggressive action. This is somewhat offset by the fact
that a revenge killing must be accompanied with por.Thus, if a
member of group A kills a member of group B, A will owe B compensation; but B can choose to seek revenge, in which case B will
have to compensate A for any deaths exceeding B's loss. This device serves to prevent escalation: B will not want to kill three
members of group A, but will seek to kill only one to ensure that
any por will offset.6 1
In equilibrium, a society with mandatory blood feud might
be expected to be one with low levels of violence. In fact, however, we observe a good deal of violence in Pashtun society. Indeed,
the response and counterresponse frequently results in an escalation of violence. Why might this be?
First, the culture of honor and reputational considerations in
a stateless environment mean that, notwithstanding the universal interest in avoiding conflict, parties will act aggressively
when they enter into Hawk-Dove interactions. The penalty from
playing Dove is very high in such an environment. Without a
centralized state to protect the weak, stronger actors may attack
them with impunity. As Thucydides classically put it, "[Tihe
strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."6 2
When a dispute arises, both sides will frequently signal that they
will play Hawk and refuse to back down, leading to a good deal of
conflict. Since failure to respond is a source of dishonor, people
may be overly quick to respond, leading to high levels of aggressive behavior. The emphasis on honor may thus be related to the
need to avoid being seen as a patsy or sucker.
Second, ambiguities in the underlying norms might contribute to conflict. 63 If parties are uncertain about the precise rules
that govern their interaction, there may be cases in which each
60 Peter Stein, Legal Institutions: The Development of Dispute Settlement 10-11
(Butterworth 1984); E. Adamson Hoebel, The Law offPrimitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics 87 (Harvard 1954).
61 Other norms include limitations on shooting during village level conflicts, and
conceding defeat after capture of a village water well. See Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and
Society at 5 (cited in note 3).
62 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian Wars Book 5 394 (J.M. Dent 1910)
(Richard Crawley, trans).
63 Ginsburg and McAdams, 45 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1257-61 (cited in note 7).
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party genuinely believes that the norm is on his side. Thus, each
party will play an aggressive strategy in the encounter, leading
to conflict. Normative ambiguity is conflict generating.
Third, even if the norms are clear, there may be disagreement about facts.6 4 Suppose that two farmers have land next to
each other and discover a valuable resource, say a spring, on the
boundary between their land. The farmers may both agree that
the spring belongs to the owner of the underlying land. But they
may disagree about the precise boundary line. Such disputes are
frequent in areas without state-organized cadastral systems.
While farmers are capable of marking boundaries without the
state, it may have not been worth delimiting the precise boundary, for example if the land was marginal before discovery of the
valuable resource.
All these factors mean that it may be helpful to have a third
party to help the parties to avoid conflict. The jirga serves in part
to help coordinate the understandings of wrongdoing and to resolve the Hawk-Dove problem. At a jirga, the disputants make
their claims (sometimes through proxies), and the community
pronounces a decision. The deliberation allows the parties to
come to a common view. Because the parties observe the process,
they have common knowledge of the proposed solutions and
change their expectations about the strategy to be played by the
other party. The jirga itself does not typically punish one side or
the other but simply facilitates the operation of private sanctions
by announcing the por. (Note, though, that in extreme cases, a
jirga can expel someone from a village or burn a house down, so
there is some capacity for collective enforcement. But, in most
cases, the jirga simply announces a remedy that is privately enforced among the parties.)
The jirga often comes into play only after disputes have arisen. It is not really a lawmaking body that announces generally
binding norms, but rather, it enforces rules that are known to all,
or makes collective decisions. Thus, the lack of ex ante clarity
about norms can contribute to violent conflict.
Another reason that Pashtun society may be violent is that
it occupies economically marginal territory, and hence is not a
wealthy society. Societies with a large social surplus typically
observe the monetization of sanctions, so that restitution is paid
in money. In a society that is relatively poor, however, other
forms of compensation are used instead of scarce cash. Indeed,
64 Id at 1261-62.
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the use of women as a form of compensation may be explained
this way. Women are particularly useful as a form of compensation in that they intertwine the families of the disputants across
generations and hence serve to reduce the incentive to engage in
violence.
The lack of resources may in part explain why the Pashtun
tribal areas have been left essentially ungoverned by modern
states into the twenty-first century. States will take territory
when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs in terms of securing the territory from other states and providing services to
the local population. If there are few resources to be had, the
benefits of control are minimal. Further, the character of the
tribal society, in which each Pashtun is armed, raises the costs of
securing the territory. For most modern states, it seems, Pashtunistan is not worth trying to control, and governments have
generally left it alone. At the same time, Afghanistan as a whole
is something of a "rentier state" in which foreign powers have
historically been manipulated and exploited to obtain political
support and economic resources.6 5
Note that, in many of the examples discussed so far, money
plays a role. A bond is seen as essential for a jirga decision, and
por is a core part of the system. This point bears some consideration, for it implies that honor is fungible and can be restored not
only through violence but through material compensation.66 Note
that women are also seen as a means of compensation; nang
(honor) is quite different from our own notions of honor. But this
expanded concept of different "currencies" of compensation for
honor helps to reduce the level of violence among groups. A
Pashtun world where only violence could restore honor would be
a violent one indeed.
Though much of the literature emphasizes restitution as the
point of sanctions, in fact, the Pashtunwali sanctions seem to
involve both restitution and an element of deterrence. When
someone steals private property, the stolen goods must be returned along with a penalty.6 7 This makes sense from an economic perspective in order to deal with the possibility of nondetection: if only restitution were required, then there would be un-

65 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapsein the InternationalSystem 48-49, 65 (Yale 1995).
66 I am indebted to Aziz Huq for this analysis.
67 International Legal Foundation, The Customary Laws of Afghanistan at 16 (cited
in note 36).

HeinOnline -- 2011 U. Chi. Legal F. 106 2011

891

ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OFPASHTUNWALI

107

derdeterrence. 68 The additional penalty helps to approach the
optimal level of punishment to deter theft in a world of imperfect
detection.
In sum, Pashtun society is violent, but has robust mechanisms to manage conflict. I see the nanawati(submission) and
the jirga as devices designed to minimize the endless spiral of
violence in the blood feud. Perversely, however, these institutions may facilitate the seeking of badal (revenge), as the perpetrator knows that the tit-for-tat will not be infinite. In addition,
the institution of paid compensation for retaliation, just as if one
was a primary perpetrator, disincentivizes retaliation and makes
initial violation more likely. Pashtun society has an equilibrium
level of violence that is somewhat high; yet it would be a profound mistake to see it as a society without order.
III. NORM CHANGE
This Section considers strategies for norm change in the
Pashtun region. It first identifies two major targets for reform:
the treatment of women and high levels of violence. It then considers literacy as a key background condition for norm change.
A.

The Treatment of Women

This Section considers some of the more problematic norms
of the Pashtun code. Of these, the treatment of women has received a good deal of popular attention but has been little researched.6 9 Many norms of the Pashtunwali concern women and
the protection of their honor. The kidnapping of a married woman is punished to the level of seven murders, which apparently
has some deterrent effect, as cases are rarely found. 70 Kidnapping other women is also punished severely.71 Adulterers (both
male and female) are killed without a requirement of por. A
woman who does not resist rape will be deemed complicit and
killed. 72 In some cases, these killings will be carried out by family

8 See generally Saul Levmore, Rethinking ComparativeLaw: Variety and Uniformityin Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 61 Tulane L Rev 235 (1986).
69 Kakar, TribalLaw of Pashtunwaliand Women's Legislative Authority at * 1 (cited
in note 48).
70 International Legal Foundation, The Customary Laws of Afghanistan at 14 (cited
in note 36).
71 See, for example, Walsh, 112 Granta at 173 (cited in note 4) (describing the kidnapping of two women and the severe response).
72 International Legal Foundation, The Customary Laws of Afghanistan at 14 (cited
in note 36).
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members of the perpetrator who are eager to redeem their honor. 7 3 For example, Ahmed recounts a case in which a married
couple arrives in a village, and the son of a villager begins having
an affair with the wife. When the villager is informed, he holds a
feast, asks everyone to pray, and then pulls out a revolver to
shoot his own son. He then hands the revolver to the husband of
the adulterer, who shoots his own wife. The villager then declares the husband his legal son and marries him to his dead
son's wife. 74
Though women's honor is central, women are in no sense
equal to men. The forced transfer of women as compensation
makes them seem akin to property. Paradoxically, and much like
slaves in the antebellum South, women have high value and are
also to be protected. For example, a man who injures or kills his
wife can be subject to a claim of par by her father, leading to a
justified killing if the por is refused. But women's agency and
legal personality are highly restricted. For example, women are
not able to inherit land under many versions of the Pashtunwali,
in direct contradiction with the sharia.7 5 Among some groups of
Pashtun, only elderly women and young children are allowed to
leave the house without a complete veil. 76 The rules of purdah
(gender segregation) mean that women are sometimes denied
access to health care and education.77
To be sure, women do have some social space in Pashtun society, but it is generally a private one.78 There are certain realms,
however, in which senior married women have authority, including making marriage decisions for the children, making decisions
about household management and resource allocation, and even
arbitrating disputes.79 There are, of course, significant local differences, with women in sedentary Pashtun tribes having more
authority than those in nomadic tribes.8 0
7

Id at 203-04.

74 Id at 205.

7 Strickland, 10.3 Canadian Army J at 52 (cited in note 41). See, for example, Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and Society at 50 (cited in note 3) (noting that shift from Pashtun
custom to sharia meant women could legally inherit land in one Pakistani district, but is
rarely practiced).
76 Kakar, 7ibal Law ofPashtunwaliand Women's Legislative Authority at *5 (cited
in note 48).
77

Id.

78 See Nancy Tapper, BarteredBrides: Politics, Gender and Marriage in an Afghan

71ibalSociety 105-06, 212 (Cambridge 1991).
7 Kakar, 7-bal Law of Pashtunwali and Women's Legislative Authority at *8-10
(cited in note 48).
80 Id at *9.
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The transfer of human beings is obviously in grave conflict
with modern notions of morality and with international human
rights law. More broadly, Pashtun practices violate virtually every provision of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the equality provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.8 1 Yet Afghanistan was one of the original states to approve the Universal
Declaration in 1948; it has acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and to the CEDAW. It is worth
considering, then, how the Pashtunwali might be modified to
comply with international norms.
B.

The Prevalence of Violence

A second area in which the Pashtunwali seems normatively
problematic is the regulation of violence. Pashtun areas tend to
have high rates of murder and violence, even if they also have
high levels of social order. While statistics are not easily available, anecdotal evidence from the Tribal Areas of Pakistan suggests that this is the case.
C.

Imposed Solutions?

There are two major normative problems with the Pashtunwali. One concerns the treatment of women, and the other concerns the high levels of violence associated with the region.
What should Western governments that are concerned about
these issues do about the Pashtunwali? By far, the dominant approach to date has been to build up institutions of state law that
are ultimately designed to displace tribal custom in favor of more
Western or universal norms. 82 Extending the reach of the Afghan
state would allow the government to comply with its international obligations while also eliminating more egregious violations of
human rights norms.
Unfortunately, this approach is unlikely to succeed. The historic weakness of the centralized state in Afghanistan is one factor, and even if it were able to extend its reach, it might not dis-

81 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discriminationagainst Women,
1249 UNTS 14 (1979), online at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/
econvention.htm (visited Sept 9, 2011); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Resolution 217 (III) A, UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).
82 Stephen Biddle, Fotini Christia, and J. Alexander Their, Defining Success in Af
ghanistan: What Can the United States Accept, 89 Foreign Affairs 48, 49-51 (2010).
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place the Pashtunwali. 83 Furthermore, the Pashtunwali has
proved resistant even to the more liberal provisions of Islamic
law with regard to the treatment of women; mutatismutandis, it
is less likely to accommodate norms that originate with infidel
Europeans.
Perversely, attempts to spread human rights norms to the
Pashtun areas, particularly norms regarding the treatment of
women, may actually increase violence by undermining the
Pashtunwali. To understand this, suppose that there was a rule
that compensation for disputes could no longer include the transfer of women from one disputing side to another. This would
mean that compensation would have to be paid in cash. Cash,
because it is fungible, is an inferior device to bond disputants
together across generations. In addition, one might expect that
the scale of compensation might rise-if we can no longer give
two young women in exchange for a woman's murder, demand
for the substitute (currency) will increase. But the basic poverty
of the region limits how much upward pressure on cash compensation is feasible. Ultimately, this may mean that there is less
deterrence from wrongdoing, and more violence. To put the matter simply: knowing that my daughters are not at risk, I am more
likely, not less likely, to pick a fight with my neighbor. 84
At the same time, a switch to such a system would have the
advantage of reducing the oppression of women. The treatment
of women in Pashtun society is so severe that this tradeoff seems
to be worthwhile. I simply point out the internal tensions between trying to solve the gender problem and the violence problem at the same time, given the political economic logic of the
Pashtunwali.
D.

Nonstate Strategies for Norm Change

Imposing norms from the outside is rarely as effective as encouraging bottom-up strategies. This is particularly true with
regard to legal institutions in this part of the world. The assumption that the rule of law could be built through the construction
of formal state-centered legal institutions in Afghanistan seems
8 See, for example, Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and Society at 94 (cited in note 3)
(telling the story of an elder pleading with the ethnographer to arrange bail for a man in
prison, so the man could return to the local area and be shot to redeem the honor of the
victim).
84 To be sure, another possibility is that the inadequacy of money as a deterrent
means that, if you dishonor your neighbor, you can no longer save yourself from being
killed by offering your daughters.
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to have been overly optimistic. It thus makes sense to consider
how norms can be changed from below. There are some comparative and historical examples of deeply entrenched social norms
being changed rather quickly with the right combination of incentives, and these might have some relevance to the Pashtunwali. 85
Let us begin with violence. If the above analysis is correct,
much of the violence in Pashtun society has to do with norms of
honor that lead to aggressive responses to insults. However, this
Article has also emphasized the ambiguity of the norms themselves as being a source of uncertainty. The instruction not to
dishonor one's fellows is pitched at a fairly high level of abstraction, with its actual content determined in very local circumstances. It follows that clearer norms might in fact reduce the
level of conflict.
How might outsiders increase the precision and certainty of
the Pashtunwali? One way to do so is to recognize that the system is essentially one of dispute resolution, not norm generation.
Dispute resolution is effective for dealing with the past. Fullfledged legal systems, however, also have ways of articulating
norms for the future. Courts routinely engage in both functions,
helping to articulate new rules through the resolution of old disputes. 86 This, in turn, can reduce the number of disputes in the
future, as potential litigants have a clearer idea of what norms
will be enforced. Precedent is conflict reducing.
My proposal is to domesticate the Pashtunwali by appearing
to reinforce it. To do so requires the introduction of literacy and a
recording system for jirga decisions. Literacy would have two
effects. First, it would allow jirga decisions to be recorded, and
thus to potentially have precedential value beyond the living
memories of current villagers. Recording jirga decisions would
make the Pashtunwali stronger, not weaker. It could lead to intervillage communication about proper norms, and allow for wise
decisions to guide future decision-makers. It might also minimize
the likelihood of disputes because it would allow future disputants to know what the rules are in advance. To give an example,
the businessman in the second case noted in Part II.C.2 above
85 See generally Lesley Wexler, Allowing Girls to Hold Up Half the Sky: Combining
Norm Promotion and Economic Incentives to Combat DaughterDiscriminationIn China,
7 Chi J Intl L 79 (2007); Gerry Mackie, EndingFootbindingand Infibulation:A Convention Account, 61 Am Socgcl Rev 999 (1996).
86 Shapiro, Courts at 12 (cited in note 23) (noting that lawmaking and dispute resolution are two functions of courts).
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would have been aware that he could not legitimately demand
the wife of a debtor (though he may have been able to demand a
daughter), and hence would not have made the fatal error of asking for the wife.8 7
Crucially, introducing literacy is consistent with demands
emanating from tribal society. As documented in Greg Mortensen's Three Cups of Tea, there is a great deal of demand for education among the rural Pashtuns and other Afghans living in
villages.88 Whatever its other developmental benefits, literacy
has the potential to improve the operation of the indigenous village-level norms as captured in the Pashtunwali. Framing the
recording system as being designed to reinforce, rather than undermine, the Pashtunwali will also make the proposal more palatable. Literacy could transform the Pashtunwali from a code of
honor into a real code of law.
How would literacy address the other normative concern
about the Pashtunwali, namely the treatment of women? Literacy, if extended to all, might help to improve the lot of women,
though the predictions here are a little more ambiguous.
As an initial matter, it is worth pointing out that the most
egregious abuses of women seem to happen in the context of disputes. If literacy made for clearer law, there might be fewer disputes and hence less need for remedies, including the abhorrent
practice of transferring women among families as compensation.
This alone would be of normative value, though it does not address the core structure of gender inequalities.
More broadly, other examples of normative change have relied on relatively equal levels of education and literacy between
men and women.89 Female literacy in Afghanistan has risen
dramatically since 2001, but it is still appallingly low. Illiteracy
no doubt weakens women's relative status in society, and there
seems to be a genuinely high level of demand among rural women for more education.9 0 Educating women would no doubt increase their ability to contribute to the household economy and
would itself go a long way toward improving their status. Literacy would also allow women to learn about international norms.
87 See notes 55-57 and accompanying text.

88 Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin, Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to
Fight Terrorism andBuild Nations ... One School at a Time 244, 317 (Viking 2006).
89 Wexler, 7 Chi J Intl L at 90-91 (cited in note 85). See generally Ronald Inglehart
and Pippa Norris, Rising 7de: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World
152 (Cambridge 2003).
90 Mortenson and Relin, Three Cups of Tea at 330 (cited in note 88).
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One might even imagine women using a system of recorded decisions to demand improvements in the rules as they shop for relatively egalitarian decisions that push norms in the direction of
better treatment.
Literacy might also affect the Pashtunwali by improving development more generally. We know that the norms of blood feud
and such tend to be less strong among more urban and educated
Pashtuns.9 1 Richer, more educated Pashtuns are less likely to
practice gender violence as well. 9 2 Though Afghanistan is unlikely to become as peaceful and prosperous as Switzerland, gradual
improvement in living standards may lead to changes in norms.
The difficulty with relying on literacy to effectuate change, of
course, is ensuring that all have access to education. Designing a
program wherein women as well as men are guaranteed education is beyond the scope of this short Article, but there is evidence that it is occurring in some regions. 93 If literacy were restricted to males, it might have some effects through its general
effect on development but would actually disempower women
even further within the family and village. It is also possible that
selective introduction of literacy could undermine the Pashtunwali by introducing status differences among the men. As described above, one of the important norms of Pashtun society is
the equality of all males. 94 If power and wealth differences are
exacerbated, the equality norm itself might be undermined. 95
Still, the literacy proposal has the advantage of being consistent with local demands and has the potential to disrupt the
most abusive practices of the normative order. It would allow an
organic evolution in the substantive Pashtunwali, while preserving the procedural institutions that are essential to governance
in a region where the state's reach is likely to remain limited for
some time to come.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Pashtunwali is one of the larger "quasi-legal" systems in the
world in terms of the number of people subject to it, and it may
be the largest such system of any stateless society. This Article

91 See Walsh, 112 Granta at 171 (cited in note 4).
92 Id.

9 Mortenson and Relin, Tree Cups of Tea at 209 (cited in note 88).
94 See note 26 and accompanying text.
9 Kakar, TribalLawofPashtunwaliand Women's Legislative Authority at *12 (cited
in note 48).
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has explained how many of its norms and institutions seem to be
designed to minimize the escalation of private violence, and
hence to preserve social order in an area where state law has
minimal reach. This case study provides some evidence that adjudication in anarchy can be functionally effective, even if it is
embedded in a set of norms that violate the rights of half the
population.
At the same time, the rules themselves are ambiguous. This
creates situations in which conflict erupts with great frequency.
Norms of honor probably make conflict more prevalent than it
would otherwise be, and the dispute resolution system, by minimizing the chance of escalation, may actually encourage quickness to claim injury. The jirga system, of course, is the backbone
of dispute resolution in rural society in this region, and I do not
assert that it should be replaced. Rather, what is needed is an
evolution in substantive norms to be applied within the Pashtunwali framework.
I propose a simple solution to facilitate normative evolution:
literacy. A system of recorded precedent would reduce the ambiguities about what counts as a violation and what level of private
retaliation for wrongs is acceptable. This would in turn have the
effect of minimizing violations while coordinating punishments.
This solution is one that takes advantage of the decentralized
nature of Pashtun society-it does not impose top-down norms,
even in the contentious area of the treatment of women, but
might ultimately facilitate convergence with more universal
standards. The key is to leverage bottom-up sources of social ordering rather than top-down commands in a region where no
state has ever held sway.
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